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TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION 
Scott Cameron Whitney 0 
I.· INTRonucrioN 
During. the present century, litigation requiring for ·its resolution a 
voluminous evidentiary record of complex and technical data has increased 
discernibly. This new breed of litigation, a product of the complex disputes 
arising from the expanding and increasingly sophisticated industrial-tech-
nical-financial establishment, has evoked various responses from the judi-
ciary. One option, utilized for federal tax litigation, is the establishment· 
of special courts.1 Such courts have been established in a number of areas 
and proposed in many others.2 In certain areas, such as antitrust, jurisdic-
tion has been retained by the "generalist" courts despite the complexity 
and prolixity of the subject matter. 
0 A.B., University of Nevada; J.D., Harvard University. Professor of Law, The 
College of William and Mary. Of Counsel, Bechhoefer, Snapp, Sharlitt & Lyman, 
Washington, D.C. 
1. The Board of Tax Appeals was created in 1918 (Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 
§ 1301(d), 40 Stat. 1057, 1141 (1919)). It was removed from the Internal Revenue 
Service by the Revenue Act of 1924 and achieved its present status as a technically 
independent agency in the executive branch of the government in 1926. It became 
known as the Tax Court by the Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504, 56 Stat. 798, 957 
( 1942), and has continued through various succeeding Revenue Acts as a distinct judi-
cial entity with national jurisdiction. Brown, The Nature af the Tax Court af the United 
States, 10 U. Pn-r L. REv. 298, 309 (1949); Del Cotto, The Need for a Court uf Tax 
Appeals: An Argument and a Study, 12 BuFF. L. REv. 5 (1962); Drennan, The Tax 
Court of the United States, 15 W. VA. B. Ass'N J. 12 ( 1959); Griswold, The Need for a 
Court af Tax Appeals, 51 HARV. L. REv. 1153, 1154 (1944) ( "[t]he Tax Court is in or-
ganization, tradition, and function a judicial body . . . ."); Henke, The Tax Court, 
The Proposed Administrative Court, and ]udicialization, 18 BAYLOR L. REV. 449 (1966); 
Note, Forum Reform: Tax Litigation, 35 U. CIN. L. REv. 644 ( 1966). 
2. The special federal courts which were proposed prior to 1918 but never 
adopted are described in Rightmire, Special Federal Courts, 13 ILL. L. REv. 15, 15-16 
( 1918 ), which discusses the proposed Court of Indian Claims, the Court of Pension 
Appeals, and the Court of Arbitration. Professor Rightmire also discusses the Court 
of Private Land Claims, which existed briefly, between March 3, 1891, and June 30, 
1904, to adjudicate claims arising under Spanish and Mexican grants in Arizona, New 
Mexico, Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, and Nevada. Id. at 18. For an account of the 
Choctaw and Chickasaw Citizenship Court see Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 
457 (1929), citing Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415 ( 1907). For reference to Indian 
Reservation Courts, see United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575 (D. Ore. 1888). Several 
special federal courts have been proposed subsequent to Professor Rightmire's history. 
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Another option available to the judiciary is to refuse to take jurisdic-
tion over disputes which make undue demands on the courts' time and/ or 
expertise. The United States Supreme Comt has adopted this approach 
to complicated "modern" disputes, most recently with respect to environ-
mental litigation. In Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemical Corp.3 the Supreme 
Court ruled on a motion by the State of Ohio to invoke the Court's original 
jurisdiction against various companies incorporated in Michigan, Delaware, 
and Canada to abate an alleged nuisance resulting in pollution of Lake 
Erie. Although Ohio's complaint stated a cause of action within the com-
pass of the Court's original jurisdiction, the Court nevertheless declined 
to exercise that jurisdiction.~ It based its decision on three reasons, one 
of which was that the Court was ill-equipped to ·resolve the complex, 
technical and novel questions presented." Justice Harlan noted that ad-
judication of complex cases involving novel scientific questions of fact and 
a multiplicity of government agencies would force the Court to reduce 
drastically its attention to other controversies for which it is a "proper 
and necessary forum." 11 
Another mechanism for handling disputes involving complex, technical 
or voluminous records is the administrative agency. Pioneer agencies, 
such as the Interstate Commerce Commission ( 1887) and the Federal 
Trade Commission (1914), were followed by a host of others, created to 
cope with, among other things, a cluster of specialized and frequently 
highly technical adjudicatory problems beyond the capability of the con-
stitutional branches of government to resolve. Institutional structures 
designed to achieve environmental reform and planning, and to cope with 
new national problems, such as energy supply, pricing and allocation, are 
especially prolific and typically determine complex disputes involving a 
broad range of scientific and technical data. A partial list of new agencies 
created since World vVar II demonstrates that the trend started by the 
Proposals for various types of administrative courts have been perennial. See generally 
Dix, The Death of the Commerce Court: A Study in Institutional Weakness, 8 AM. J. 
LEGAL HisT. 238 ( 1964). A number of proposals for special administrative courts 
advocate a special labor court. See Kutner, Due Process of Economy: A Proposal for 
a United States Economy Court, 15 U. MIAMI L. REv. 341 ( 1961 ). For a discussion 
of the Emergency Court of Appeals, see Laws, The Work of the United States Emer-
gency Court of Appeals, 11 J.B. Ass'N D.C. 100 (1944). For a description of the 
Court of Claims, the Customs Court and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 
see UNITED STATEs CovEHNMENT 0HGANIZATION MANUAL (1974-75) . 
. '3. 401 U.S. 493 (1971 ). 
4. Id. at 495. 
5. Id. at 501-05. Tlw other two reasons were workload considerations and the 
availability of better relief in state or federal district courts or in a commission study 
through mutual cooperation. lei. at 498-504. The Court noted that Ohio was raising 
factual questions of first impression even to scientists. Id. at 504. 
6. Id. at 504-05. 
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creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission is continuing in the 
second half of the twentieth century at an accelerated rate.7 
The adjudicatory functioning of the pre-W odd War II agencies attracted 
during the decades of the fifties and sixties the criticism, and even con-
demnation, of practitioners, government administrators and legal scholars.8 
7. The following partial list includes not only agencies having an adjudicatory 
dimension, but also agencies which provide technical or scientific data and expertise 
relied on · in regulatory decisionmaking. The list also includes agencies that 
have been restructured or given new functions since World War II: Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration, Federal Aviation Administration, Transportation 
Safety Board, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the various agencies 
implementing the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 (Cost of Living Council, Price 
Commission and Wage Board), Atomic Energy Commission (now Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission), U.S. Railway Association, Council on Environmental Quality, Federal 
Energy Administration, International Trade Commission, Energy· Research and De-
velopment Admininstration. For examples of Congress' authorizing older entities 
to perform new functions, see the addition to the Federal Trade Commission of con-
sumer product warranty functions (Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commis-
sion Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 45-46 (Sup. 1975) ), and the addition of the 
regulation of deepwater ports to Coast Guard responsibilities (Deepwater Ports Act 
of 1974, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1501-24 (Supp. 1975) ). 
8. Beelar, Federal Legislation: United States Administrative Court, 24 CEo. L.J. 
944 (1936) ; Benjamin, A Lawyer's View of Administrative Procedure-The American 
Bar Association Program, 26 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoB. 203, 219-23 ( 1961); Cooper, 
The Proposed United States Administrative Court (pts. 1-2), 35 MICH. L. REv. 193, 
565 ( 1936-1937) (analysis of the Logan-Walter Bill); Davison, An Administrative 
Court of the United States, 24 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 613 ( 1956); Hector, Problems of 
the CAB and the Independent Regulatory C ominissions, 69 YALE L. J. 931 ( 1960 ) ; 
McGuire, A Possible Federal Administrative Court, 20 J. AM. Jun. Soc'y 238 (1937). 
For a debate of the merits of a trade court, see Berger, Administrative Courts, 27 J. 
B. Ass'N D.C. 16 ( 1960); Kintner, The Administrative Court Proposal-Or Should 
Judicial Functions of Administrative Agencies Be Transferred to an Administrative 
Court, 24 J.B. Ass'N D.C. 10 ( 1957); Sellers, The Administrative Court Proposal-
Or Should Judicial Functions of Administrative Agencies Be Transferred to an Ad-
ministrative Court, 23 J.B. Ass'N D.C. 703 ( 1956). See also Berger, A Reply to 
Commissioner Macintyre's Attack on the Trade Court Proposal, 29 J.B. Ass'N D.C. 
337 ( 1962); Berger, Removal of Judicial Functions from the Federal Trade Commis-
sion to a Trade Court: A Reply to Mr. Kintner, 59 MICH. L. REv. 199 (1960); Kint-
ner, The Trade Proposal: An Examination of Some Possible Defects, 44 A.B.A.]. 441 
( 1958); Kintner, The Current Ordeal of the Administrative Process: In Reply to Mr. 
Hector, 69 YALE L.J. 965 (1960) (defense of the Federal Trade Commission's per-
formance and opposition to a trade court); Macintyre, Administrative Court Proposal, 
29 J.B. Ass'N D.C. 316 (1962); Minor, The Administrative Court: Variations on a 
Theme, 19 OHio ST. L.J. 380 (1958). See also COMMISSION oN ORGANIZATION OF THE 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GovERNMENT, A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 86-88 ( 1955) 
(Hoover Committee Report); PRESIDENT's ADVISORY CouNCIL ON ExECUTIVE ORGANIZA-
TION, REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT AGENCIES, A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
( 1971 ) (Ashe Committee Report) ; SENATE CoMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT oN 
REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT ELECT, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 72-74 (i960) 
( Landis Report). · 
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These attacks included the contentions ( 1) that over-judicialization of the 
agencies was producing undue delay in decisionmaking;9 (2) that the 
objectivity of their judicial functioning had been tainted by their promo-
tional and developmental activities and objectives;10 and ( 3) that their de-
cisions had come to lack precedential value and that confusion and ad-
ministrative drift held sway.11 That many of the industries regulated by 
these pre-war agencies (notably the railroads, the airlines and the maritime 
industry) faced bankruptcy or massive federal subsidies gave strength to 
the criticism that the dilatory and cumbersome adjudicatory format of the 
agencies had outlived its usefulness.12 
The second and third difficulties listed above are beyond the scope of 
this paper. The first, undue delay in decisionmaking, has been analyzed 
elsewhere in procedural terms.13 While procedural reform can contribute 
importantly to correcting this problem, 14 the critical question is whether 
9. Benjamin, supra note 8, at 222; Berger, Removal af Judicial Functions from the 
Federal Trade Commissi'on to a Trade Court: A Reply to Mr. Kintner, 59 MICH. L. 
REV. 199, 223-25 (1960); Hector, supra note 8, at 957-58. 
10. Benjamin, supra note 8, at 219-20; Berger, supra note 9, at 204-06; Hector, 
supra note 8, at 956-57. For a recent solution to an alleged built-in functional -con-
flict, note the disestablishment of the Atomic Energy Commission and the vesting of 
its developmental functions in the Energy Research and Development Administration. 
Its regulatory, licensing and enforcement functions were vested in the Nuclear Regu-
latory Agency. See Ene.rgy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5801, 5811 
(Supp. 1975). 
11. For a penetrating analysis of this problem, its causes and suggested remedies, 
See H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER 
DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 1-26, 7 4-105 ( 1962 ) . 
12. The Ford Administration has announced that it favors deregulation of the 
commercial airline industry, and the C';ivil Aeronautics Board has issued a study 
recommending partial deregulation. REGULATORY REFORM: REPORT OF THE C.A.B. 
SPECIAL STAFF (July 1975). Three of the largest air carriers (Pan American World 
Airways, Trans World Airlines and Eastern Airlines) have applications pending be-
fore the CAB for annual subsidies which aggregate approximately one-half billion dollars 
per year. Pan Am Docket 26560, Pan Am-TWA Docket 27031, TWA Dockets 26563 
and 27805, EAL Docket 28787. 
The Interstate Commerce Commission is generally regarded as being unequal 
to the task of resuscitating the railroad industry. Congress in 1972 enacted the 
Railway Reorganization Act mandating a final plan to restructure the rail industry 
in a new and economically viable form. The maritime industry has for many decades 
been the "sick man" of the United States transportation establishment. While the 
causes for this condition are manifold and beyond the scope of this paper, the ad-
judicatory procedures of the Federal Maritime Commission are one factor. 
13. Louis Hector suggests in his vivid description of the CAB handling of the 
Seven States Area Investigation that the problem arises from inept procedures, failure 
to control and limit the judicial process adequately, and a fatally repetitive and 
largely futile review procedure structured· within the agency process. Hector, supra 
note 8, at 931. 
14. The Civil Aeronautics Board is engaged presently in procedural reform. See 
FINAL REPORT OF CAB ADVISORY CoMMITTEE ON PROCEDURAL REFORM (Dec. 31, 
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agency adjudicatory process can evaluate competently specialized scien-
tific and technical data to produce fair and rational decisions within an 
acceptable period of time and at an acceptable cost to the litigants, the 
regulated entities and the public. The data bearing on the critical issues 
in such complex proceedings are qualitatively different from the material 
that administrative agencies and special courts traditionally have handled. 
Although agencies and specialized courts are said to have special ex-
pertise, the members bring to their tasks not expertise arising from mastery 
of a distinct, substantive technical or scientific discipline, but experience 
derived from extensive familiarity with a special subject.15 Gardner, ob-
serving that "in most agencies the commissioner or the head is in no sense 
an expert," cautioned against building up "our law and our thinking on 
the fiction of their invariable expertise." 16 Even the career agency staff, 
although experts as students or analysts, observe "from the outside and 
with a touch of unfamiliarity." 17 
The complex scientific and technical subject matter that is considered 
in many modem agency adjudications is radically different from that involved 
in the traditional independent agency decisionmaking process. This study 
will consider two adjudicatory situations which illustrate the problem of 
handling this subject matter effectively in the present procedural format. 
II. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus 
International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus 18 illustrates the difficulties 
inherent in a generalist court's review of a decision made by a specialist 
agency. PJ;suant to congressional directive, the administrator of the EPA . 
issued in ~970 regulations limiting automobile hydrocarbon and carbon 
monoxide emissions to .41 and 3.4 grams per vehicle mile and prescribing 
test procedures to measure compliance.19 The Clean Air Amendments 20 
required automobile manufacturers to meet these standards with their 1975 
1975 ). The Federal Maritime Commission enacted reforms in its Rules of Practice 
and Procedure in 1974, 39 Fed. Reg. 33221-26 (1974), and is considering further proce-
dural amendments. Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Docket No. 75-36, 40 Fed. 
Reg. 43925-30 ( 1975). 
15. See Mr. Justice Jackson's discussion of the Tax Court in Dobson v. Commis-
sioner, 320 U.S. 489, 498-99 ( 1943). 
16. W. GARDNER, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS ToDAY AND ToMoRRow 113 (1959). 
17. Id. 
18. 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
19. 36 Fed. Reg. 12,657 (1971). 
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-1(b)(l)(A) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857f-1(b) 
(l)(A) (Supp. 1976), provided that "engines manufactured during or after model year 
1975 shall contain standards which require a reduction of at least 90 per centum 
from emissions of carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons allowable under the standards 
. . . applicable to light duty vehicles and engines manufactured in model year 1970." 
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models. A one year "suspension" of the deadline could be obtained if a 
manufacturer made certain statutory showings.21 
On March 13, 1972, Volvo, Inc. filed such an application for suspension, 
thereby starting the running of a 60-day period during which the ad-
ministrator had to decide whether or not to grant the suspension.22 In 
April EPA held public hearings at which the applicants, representatives of 
most major vehicle manufacturers, suppliers of emission control devices, 
and public interest groups testified or submitted written data for the record. 
The EPA Hearing Board did not permit oral cross-examination or challenge 
of the methodology on which EPA relied.23 On May 12, 1972 EPA issued 
its decision denying suspension to all applicants. 24 fhe decision was fur-
ther augmented on July 27, 1972 by a Technical Appendix setting forth 
the analysis and methodology used by EPA in reaching its decision. 25 
The EPA decision noted that the test procedures used by the applicants 
differed from the 1975 Federal test procedure and required conversion to 
the 1975 procedure by imprecise calculations. Furthermore, incomplete 
data had been submitted.26 Instead of simply concluding that the applicants 
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-1b(5)(D) (Supp. 1976). The applicant must show that: 
( i) such suspension is essential to the public interest or the public health 
and welfare of the United States, (ii) all good faith efforts have been made 
to meet the standards established by this subsection, (iii) the applicant has 
established that effective control technology, processes, operating methods, or 
other alternatives are not available or have not been available for a sufficient 
period of time to achieve compliance prior to the effective date of such 
standards, and ( iv) the study and investigation of the National Academy of 
Sciences conducted pursuant to subsection (c) of this section and other 
information available to him has not indicated that such technology, process, 
or other alternatives are available to meet such standards. 
I d. § 1857f-1 (b) ( 5) (C) ( i-iv). 
22. International Harvester, Ford, Chrysler and General Motors also filed applica-
tions for suspension. 478 F.2d at 624. 
23. Section 202 (b) ( 5) (D) does not require a trial-type hearing, but merely a 
"public hearing." This is in contrast to section 110( f) ( 2) (hearing on a one-year post-
ponement of a plan requirement upon application by a state governor) and section 
206( b) ( 2) (B) (i") ( 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-5( b) ( 2) (B)( i) ( Supp. 1976)) (hearing on sus-
pension or revocation of a motor vehicle certification) decisions, which must be made 
"on the record." 
24. In re Applications for Suspensions of 1975 Motor Vehicle Exhaust Emission 
Standards, Decision of the Administrator (May 12, 1972) (hereafter cited as EPA 
Decision). · 
25. Id. at Technical Appendix (July 27, 1972). 
26. Id. at 16-17. This decision was appealed by Applicants to the D.C. Circuit 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(l) (Supp. 1976). On December 19, 1972, the 
day after oral argument, the court, in a per curiam order, remanded the record to 
the Administrator, directing him to supplement his decision by explaining what con-
sideration he gave the study of the National Academy of Sciences and the basis of 
any disagreement with that study. On Decemher 30, EPA responded with a sup-
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for suspension had not submitted data that conformed to the testing and 
measuring requirements required by EPA regulations, and that they had 
therefore failed to meet the burden of proof required for suspension in 
section 202( b) ( 5) (D) (iii) of the Act, EPA sought to "adjust" the data 
submitted by the applicants by use of certain "assumptions." 27 The tac-
tical decision to pursue this complex "adjustment" of applicants' data shifted 
the burden of proof on appellate review from the applicants to show that the 
technology would not be available to EPA to show that it would be 
available. On review, the D.C. Circuit indicated that for purposes of 
judicial review EPA did have the burden. The court stated: "As matters 
have shaped up, the central technical issue on this appeal concerns the 
reliability of EPA's methodology. . . . We shall subsequently develop 
the leg~l questions, primarily questions of EPA's burden of proof, that 
arise with respect to EPA methodology." 28 
The reviewing court addressed itself to three aspects of EPA - pro-
cedure: the applicants' right to cross-examine, the applicants' right to 
comment on EPA methodology, and the respective roles of the agency_and 
the court. The majority adopted a curiously ambivalent stance to _the 
applicants' claimed right to cross-examine. In Part II of the opinion, the 
court ruled that the Act did not require an "adjudicatory" hearing with a 
decision based "on the record." The court, emphasizing the 60-day time 
limit, stated that because of "[t]he heft of the hearing problem, in-
cluding the time constraints on decisions, a broad right 13f cross-examination 
cannot be maintained." 29 The court noted the "not insignificant potential 
for havoc" 30 in the combinations of cross-examinations, redirect examina-. 
tions, and recross examinations. Further, it stated that "these complications 
are likely to be disproportionate to the values achieved in a proceeding · 
focusing on technical matters where other techniques generally are .sufficient 
to adduce the pertinent information as to both what is known and un-
known." 31 The court concluded that EPA's substitute for cross-examina-
tion, the screening of written questions, was reasonable and com-
ported with basic faimess.32 However, in Part V of its opinion, the court 
stated: 
In the remand proceeding-not governed by the same time congestion as 
the initial decision process-we require reasonable cross-examination as to 
respond with a supplement to its decision. Thereafter the court reviewed the EPA 
decision and on February 10, 1973, remanded for further proceedings. 478 F.2d 650. 
27. See 37 Fed. Reg. 23778-79 ( 1972). 
28. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 632 (D.C. Cir. 
1973). 
29. Id. at 631. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
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new lines of testimony, and as to submissions previously made to EPA in 
the hearing on a proffer that critical questions could not be satisfactorily 
pursued by procedures previously in effect.33 
The court's treatment of the cross-examination question appears incom-
prehensible, if not perversely self-contradictory. Indeed, Chief Judge 
Bazelon, while concurring in the result, could find nothing in the 60-day 
time limit to support the distinction between cross-examination at the time 
of the original decision and on remand.34 There is little doubt that Con-
gress set the 60-day limit to force prompt conclusive determination of an 
obviously time-critical issue.:m However, congressional intent was thwarted 
by the slow adjudicatory process. Between the filing of the applications 
for suspension and the second remand, almost a ·year elapsed-a time 
nearly equal to the length of the suspension being sought. 
Addressing the applicants' claimed right to comment on EPA meth-
odology at the hearing, the court again made contradictory statements. 
In Part II, "Rejection of Manufacturers' General Contentions," the court 
noted that it could not ignore the problem of time and likened the 
instant case to the conventional rulemaking situation. 
The requirement of submission of a proposed rule for comment does not 
automatically generate a new opportunity for comment merely because the 
rule promulgated by the agency differs from the rule it proposed, partly 
at least in response to submissions.36 
To this statement is appended the footnote, "[a] contrary rule would lead 
to the absurdity that in rule making under the APA the agency can learn 
from the comments on its proposals only at the peril of starting a new 
procedural round of commentary." 37 The analogy missed the gravamen 
of the applicants' complaint, i.e .. , that EPA did not disclose its meth-
odology and much of its analysis until long after the hearing was terminated. 
Later in the opinion, the court abandoned this earlier incorrect position 
and, noting that the record '1eaves this court uncertain, at a minimum, 
whether the essentials of the intention of Congress were achieved," ordered 
a remand to allow the applicants to address the methodology and analysis 
contained in the Technical Appendix.as 
33. Id. at 649. 
34. Id. at 652-53. 
35. Congress had in fact dropped in conference an earlier version of the Act that 
would have allowed six months for a suspension decision. 478 F.2d at 630. See 
also 116 Con g. Record 33078-79 (1970). 
36. 478 F.2d at 632. 
37. Id. at 632 n .. 51. This statement is baffiing. Not only is it not descriptive of 
the facts of the case at bar, but the court is simply in error about agency disinclina-
tion to receive two "rounds of commentary." Many agencies issue an Advanced No-
tice of Proposed Rule Making to solicit comment upon the basis of which a Notice of 
Proposed Rule Making is formulated and circulated to elicit further comments to "fine-
tune" the ultimate rule that is promulgated. 
38. Id. at 649-50. 
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Chief Judge Bazelon criticized the court's decision, because he consid-
ered challenge of EPA methodology through judicial revie'Y an inade-
quate substitute for confrontation prior to the decision. He based his 
position both on fairness to the parties and on the court's limited ability 
to deal with technical intricacies.39 
In discussing the fundamental issue of the respective roles of agency 
and court in controversies requiring decisions based on evaluation of com-
plex scientific and technical evidence, the majority again paid lip service 
to one rule and applied another. It stated: 
It is with utmost diffidence that we approach our assignment to review 
the Administrator's decision on "available technology." ... Our diffidence 
is rooted in the underlying technical complexities, and remains even when 
we take into account that ours is a judicial review, and not a technical or 
policy redetermination, our review is channeled by a salutary restraint, and 
deference to the expertise of an agency that provides reasoned analysis.40 
After this statement, the majoriry undertook a detailed· and lengthy re-
examination of the regulatory, engineering, scientific, and statistical assump-
tions of EPA. The majority appeared to presume that promulgated 
EPA regulations (e.g. those regarding maintenance of catalytic converters 
and the lead content levels in fuel) would not be effective or enforceable.41 
Despite its claimed diffidence, the majority freely substituted its own 
judgment on scientific and engineering assumptions.42 It adopted without 
convincing explanation the statistical assumptions of the National Academy 
of Sciences rather than those of EPA. 43 
This performance provoked Chief Judge Bazelon's comment: 
Socrates said that wisdom is the recognition of how much one does not 
know. I may be wise if that is wisdom, because I recognize that I do not 
know enough about dynamometer extrapolations, . deterioration factor ad-
justments, and the like to decide whether or not the government's approach 
to these matters was statistically valid. Therein lies my disagreement with 
the majority. 
The court's opinion today centers on a substantive evaluation of the 
Administrator's assumptions and methodology. I do not have the technical 
know-how to agree or disagree with that evaluation-at least on the basis 
of the present record .... 
I cannot believe that Congress intended this court to delve into the sub-
stance of the mechanical, statistical, and technological disputes in this case.44 
The foregoing situation illustrates the shortcomings inherent in judicial 
review of agency adjudication of highly technical issues. The tradi-
tional agency adjudication process produced a record which the reviewing 
39. Id. at 651-52. 
40. Id. at 641. 
41. Id. at 643-44. 
42. Id. at 647-49. 
43. Id. at 649. 
44. Id. at 650-51. 
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court perceived a need to supplement and supplant with its own sub-
stantive analysis of the technical and scientific data. The solution of the 
problem is not the elimination of judicial review, for its assures agency 
accountability. Instead, the underlying agency process must be revised 
so that it both functions within reasonable time limits and provides a 
reviewing court with evidence that the agency has reached its decision 
on the basis of a rational decisionmaking process. 
III. . LICENSING OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FACILITIES 
A. The Problem 
The problem of handling complex scientific and technical issues in agency 
adjudicatory format also· arises in the licensing of nuclear energy facilities. 
Under existing procedures the licensing of a nuclear generating plant can 
involve three federal proceedings and a siting clearance by state or local 
govemments.45 The licensing proceeding for the construction permit 46 
typically requires, inter alia, submission by the applicant of several volpmes 
of information containing a detailed preliminary safety analysis report and 
an environmental impact report. The Atomic Energy Commission regu-
latory staff reviews the data in detail and requires submission of additional 
material deemed necessary. During this evaluative period the regulatory 
staff, in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
( NEPA) ,47 also prepares and publishes the draft environmental impact 
statement and obtains comment from federal, state and local government 
agencies and the public. The application for construction permit, filed 
late in the staff review process, is scrutinized successively by the Advisory 
Committee on Reactor Safeguards in an informal hearing, by the Atomic 
Safety and Licensing Board in a formal adjudicatory hearing under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, and finally by either the Atomic Safety and 
Licensing Appeal Board or the Commission. 
Similar proceedings are conducted to evaluate an operating permit ap-
plication. In addition, an Atomic Safety and Licensing hearing is required 
when requested by a party who shows that his interests will be affected 
by the issuance of the permit. Syction 105 of the Atomic Energy Act 
further protracts the licensing process by requiring review of antitrust 
aspects of these· applications.48 The antitrust division of the Department 
of Justice may recommend an additional hearing to explore the antitrust 
impacts.49 · The· National Environmental Policy Act, as judicially inter-
45. See generally Hennessey, Liceming of Nuclear Power Plants by the· Atomic 
Energy Commission, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 487 (1974). 
46. 10 C.F.R. § 50.23 (1975). The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 abolished 
the Atomic Energy Commission ( AEC) and assigned its primary functions to two 
separate agencies. See note 10 supra. 
47. 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-47 (1970). 
48. Id. § 2135 (1970). 
49. Id. 
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preted, expands the scope of nuclear licensing and regulation to include 
consideration of air and water pollution, noise, fish and wildlife, ecological, 
aesthetic, sociological, and economic factors, and the protection of historic 
and cultural resources.50 
The completion of this ramified regulatory scrutiny presently requires 
between nine and ten years. This delay is prima facie evidence that the 
regulatory process is fundamentally defective. In auy era a decisionmaking 
process requiring a decade to .act would be undesirable; given the pace of 
events in contemporary society, such delay is intolerable. It virtually 
eliminates expansion of nuclear power as a means of attaining national 
energy self-sufficiency in the next two decades. 
Although the causes of delay are diverse, the most apparent cause is 
the multiple-licensing, multiple-hearing format structured by Congress. The 
NEPA process compounds this delay by significantly enlarging the range 
of issues that must be considered and by injecting multiple interdisciplinary 
evidentiary considerations. Further delays in the processing result from 
tactics employed by public interest parties who have aggressively con-
tested the grant of the requisite licenses at each procedural stage, including 
judicial review. The conflict between counsel for these public interest 
groups and counsel for the applicants and the regulatory agency results in 
protracted administrative trials utilizing the panoply of legal techniques 
associated with protracted litigation in the courts. 51 . The public interest 
groups seek at the prehearing conference to raise every conceivable relevant 
issue; they also seek to utilize the new "right to know" provisions of NEPA 
and expanded interpretations of the Freedom of Information Act 112 to 
obtain through discovery procedures voluminous information from the 
applicant and the regulatory staff. Disputes over disclosure of information 
have resulted in extended delays at various stages of the licensing process.53 
These disputes not only require interpretations of NEPA and the Freedom 
of Information Act, but also present the question whether certain informa-
tion is proprietary data.54 
Once a hearing is commenced, further delay results from cross-examina-
tion of technical witnesses. In many contested proceedings the public 
interest groups rely on massive cross-examination, rather than on the 
testimony of technical rebuttal witnesses, to obstruct the grant of the 
necessary licenses and permits. This tactic produces voluminous and 
often cumulative evidentiary records which build ·delay into the ensuing 
50. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 
1971 ). 
51. San Antonio v. CAB, 374 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
52. 5 u.s.c. § 552 (1970). 
53. Hennessey, supra note 45, at 494-95. 
54. AEC rules protect "proprietary data" from public disclosure. 10 C.F.R. 
§ 2.790 ( 1973). 
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evaluative process.55 These dilatory tactics are re-employed when public 
interest groups are able to obtain adjudicatory hearings at the operating 
license stage. 
B. Current Attempts to Reform the Process 
The Atomic Energy Commission and outside commentators have pro-
posed various changes and reforms to shorten lead times in the licensing· 
of nuclear facilities. 56 To date the shortest period estimated for a reformed 
and "streamlined" process which would not compromise safety and en-
vironmental standards is five to six years.57 Some of these reforms are 
possible within the present statutory framework; others would require 
statutory amendment. Changes not requiring amendment include the 
"standardization" of the design of nuclear power plants and their com-
ponents,58 and the use of generic rulemaking to govern disposition of cer-
tain issues now considered on a repetitive ad hoc basis. 
Standardization could take three forms. The first approach would 
utilize a "reference system." The nuclear regulatory staff would ap-
prove a basic plant design; individual applicants could preclude ad hoc 
review by indicating that they planned to use the approved design in the 
proposed plant. Under this approach only the siting of the plant would 
be considered in the individual licensing proceeding. This method has 
been criticized on the ground that it could freeze technological progress 
to the approved design, decrease competition in the nuclear design indus-
try and lessen public participation.5n A second possible standardization 
technique would be simultaneous agency evaluation of two or more iden-
tical design proposals submitted for plants at different locations.6° Finally, 
the regulatory agency could issue a manufacturing license to the architect-
engineer-manufacturer for a specific design which applicant utilities could 
then adopt. Again, only the siting considerations would be considered in 
the individual application proceedings.61 
The Atomic Energy Commission has experimented with "generic" mle-
making to ayoid repetitive trial of basic issues in each licensing proceeding. 
Examples of this experiment include the attempts ( 1) to determine per-
55. In one proceeding the hearing on the issues of radiological health and safety 
took 56 days and produced 15,000 pages of transcript. See In re Long Island Lighting 
Co., No. 50-322 (AEC April 12, 1973). 
56. See Shapar & Maisch, Proposed Changes i11 the Nuclear Power Plant Licensing 
Process: The Choice of Putting a Finger in the Dike or Building a New Dike, 15 Whl. 
& MARY L. REV. 539 ( 1974 ). 
57. Directive of President Nixon, 120 Cong. Rec. 369 (Jan. 23, 1974). 
58. See AEC Press Release No. R-85 (Mar. 5, 1973). 
59. Trosten & Moore, Nuclear Power Plant Standardization: Promises and Pitfalls, 
15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 527, 529 ( 1974). 
60. Id. at 530. 
61. Id. at 531. 
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formance criteria for emergency core cooling systems, 62 ( 2) to determine 
whether planned discharges of low-level radioactive materials meet the 
"as-low-as-practicable" regulatory standard,63 ( 3) to determine the en-
vironmental effects of nuclear power reactors in relation to the total impact 
of the uranium fuel cycle,64 ( 4) to determine the environmental impacts 
of transporting various radioactive materials,65 ( 5) to develop general 
environmental siting criteria for nuclear plants, 66 and ( 6) to devise criteria 
under which site excavation and preparation could be commenced prior 
to grant of. the construction permit.67 Unfortunately, in a number of these 
rulemaking efforts so-called "adjudicatory" generic rulemaking with formal 
hearings was utilized. The emergency core cooling system hearings re-
quired 125 days of hearings and produced 22 thousand pages of transcript 
plus 15 thousand pages of written testimony and exhibits, the major part 
dealing with abstruse, leading-edge scientific issues.68 Thus, the AEC ex-
perience suggests that the use of adjudicatory hearings in its rulemaking 
process tends to be self-defeating and offsets to a major· extent the ad-
vantages anticipated from disposing of certain issues by generic considera-
tion. 
The limited success of these reforms has prompted the Atomic Energy 
Commission to advocate three changes in the Atomic Energy Act: 69 
(I) Amendment of section 189(a) 70 to eliminate mandatory public hear-
ings prior to the grant of a construction permit, unless requested by an 
interested party; 
( 2) Amendment of section 182 (b) 71 to eliminate mandatory review by 
the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards unless required by the 
Commission; and 
{3) Amendment of section 189(a) of the Act 72 to allow the Commission 
to permit interim operation of a nuclear plant prior to a hearing when there 
has been a showing that such operation is necessary to meet a power need 
in a given area. 
If these amendments were enacted, applicants could elect among three 
alternative procedures proposed by the Commission: ( 1) the present li-
censing system with the above reforms, ( 2) a combined construction and 
62. AEC Docket No. RM-50-1. 
63. AEC Docket No. RM-50-2. 
64. Final Regulations were published April 22, 1974. 30 Fed. Reg. 14188 ( 1968). 
65. 38 Fed. Reg. 3334 ( 1973). 
66. Id. at 3106. 
67. 39 Fed. Reg. 14506 (1974). 
68. Shapar & Maisch, supra note 56, at 542 & n.11. 
69. Id. at 545. 
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2239( a) ( 1970 ). 
71. Id. § 2232(b). 
72. I d. § 2239 ( a). A further reform would be amendment of section 2235 to 
eliminate the present requirement that construction permits state the earliest and 
latest dates for completion. 
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operating permit licensing,7a and (3) issuance of a temporary license.74 None 
of these options would affect the antitrust review procedures or the NEP A 
process. As noted, tl-:e most optimistic appraisal of the time impact of 
these reforms is reduction of the overall processing time from the present 
nine to ten years, to five to six years. In view of the national energy re-
quirements, this is still an unacceptably long and costly process. 75 
IV. A SuGGESTED ALTERNATIVE 
The problem of resolving technical and scientific issues reliably and 
within acceptable time constraints arises at two points in the present deci-
number of contentions involving subject matter comprehensible to the 
ondly, in judicial review. Attempts to solve the problem should be di-
rected toward the agency level. As Chief Judge Bazelon stated: 
In cases of great technological complexity, the best way for courts to 
guard against unreasonable or erroneous administrative decisions is not for 
the judges themselves to scrutinize the technical merits of each decision. 
Rather, it is to establish a decision-making process which assures a reasoned 
decision that can be held up to the scrutiny of the scientific community 
and the public. 76 
In formulating a satisfactory alternative to existing practice, one must 
recognize that the rulemaking and agency adjudication methods con-
cretized by the Administrative Procedures Act,77 do not exhaust the pos-
73. This would require an amendment of section 185 ( 42 U .S.C. § 2235 ( 1970) ) . 
74. A site permit would be issued before the filing of an application for either a 
construction permit or a combined construction and operating permit. After site 
approval, the Commission could allow site preparation and could grant temporary 
permission to operate the reactor prior to any hearing. A hearing would be granted 
only if a party demonstrated that one was necessary in order to consider modified 
requirements to protect public health, the common defense and security, or the en-
vironment. This procedure would require amendment of section 192 ( 42 · U.S.C. 
§ 2242 (1970)). 
75. Similar regulatory problems face the development of oil shale as an energy 
source. The oil shale program of the Department of the Interior, although under 
consideration for at least a decade, is still in the program development stage. Numer-
ous environmental, technical and scientific questions remain to be resolved before the 
licensing-of-individual-projects phase is commenced. There is thus the opportunity 
to establish expedited procedures to regulate this important activity. The coal fuel 
cycle likewise involves extensive regulatory clearances. See FEDEHAL ENERGY REGU-
LATION: AN ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY PREPAHED BY FEDEHAL ENERGY REGULATION 
STUDY TEAM (Apr. 1974). The regulatory techniques for management of such ad-
vanced fuel modes as fusion and solar energy have not yet been devised. In each 
instance the regulatory format must be structured to resolve complex scientific and 
technical questions in a reliable manner and within an acceptable time frame. 
76. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652 (D.C. Cir. 
1973 ). 
77. See, e.g., Hearings on Administrative Procedure Before the House Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 79th Con g., 1st Sess. 29 ( 1945): "There are two kinds of operations 
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sibilities. These APA categories have been criticized for obstructing the 
development of administrative procedures tailored to the needs of agen-
cies.78 Attempts to break out of these categorical confines, such as analysis 
of agency decisionmaking in terms of "adjudicative facts" and '1egislative 
facts," have not produced effective methods for evaluating vast amounts 
of technical-scientific data.7ll There is a growing awareness that the ad-
judicatory agency hearing conducted "on the record" is not the optimal 
method to produce a "reasoned decision" in these complex cases. 80 One 
critic, addressing agency judicialization, noted that the adjudicatory hear-
ing merely "preserves the appearance of the rule of law, making it 
seem that the immensely important allocation and planning process is being 
carried out at all times subject to fair and equitable guiding principles." 81 
To the extent that this observation is valid, use of the adjudicatory hearing 
can in fact produce. pernicious results. 
There is significant evidence that court-developed litigation techniques 
in the format of the traditional adversary proceeding are not viable means 
of resolving technical-scientific questions. Most of the elements of the trial-
type proceeding evolved in circumstances markedly different from those 
surrounding the agency licensing process. Cross-examination, for ex-
ample, developed in the context of two-party controversy in which 
the trier of fact sought to adduce the truth or falsity of a limited 
number of contentions involving subject matter comprehensible to the 
average judge. Extensive cross-examination is clearly ill-suited for use 
in multi-party cases involving an immense volume ·of highly compl~x 
data, often expressed in thousands of pages of exhibits spanning several 
specialized technical disciplines, and calling for subtle judgmental deter-
minations by the hearing offi.cer.82 Cross-examination frequently is used 
as a substitute for discovery or as an alternative to calling one's own ex-
pert witnesses. The potential for dilatory tactics in such a system is ob-
vious and the probability of rational decision is slight. 
An adequate administrative decisionmaking process must produce a 
"reasoned decision" and convince the public that a responsible and ra-
as all studies have indicated and any practitioner knows: Number 1, the issuance of 
a general regulation, which is similar to a statute; Number 2, the matter of adjudica-
tion, similar to the judgment of. a court." 
78. See Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rule-
making and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 
485, 536 (1970). 
79. K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT §7.03, at 160 (1971). 
80. Green, Public Participation in Nuclear Power Plant Licensing: The Great Delu-
sion, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 503, 518-19 ( 1974). 
81. Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1237 (1966). 
82. See Hamburger, Functions of Orality in Austrian and American Civil Proce-
dure, 20 BuFF. L. REv. 9, 36 (1970): "If cross-examination really is the 'greatest 
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,' one wonders why other legal 
systems have not imported that fabulous 'engine.'" 
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tional determination has been made.83 This presupposes the opportunity 
for appropriate substantive comment by the public and a mechanism of 
agency response that indicates convincingly that these comments have been 
considered fairly and adequatelv in reaching the decision. A substitute 
decisionmaking process must be i:npartial and competent, function within ac-
ceptable time and cost limitations, provide adequate notice, consider and 
respond to expressed viewpoints, and contain provisions for review. 
A "comprehensive impact statement process" patterned after the decision-
making methodology established under the National Environmental Policy 
Act for preparation of environmental impact statements 84 would satisfy 
these criteria. NEPA requires all federal decisionmakers to evaluate at 
the earliest possible moment the environmental con&equences of their pro-
posed decisions. If a proposed decision would affect the environment sig-
nificantly, the "lead" agency must prepare a draft environmental impact 
statement.85 The preparation of this statement assures "a case-by-case 
balancing judgment on the part of federal agencies. In each individual 
case, the particular economic and technical benefits of planned action must 
be assessed and then weighed against the environmental costs." 86 
One of the distinctive features of the impact statement process is that 
substantive input by interested parties is achieved by means of a comment 
process. Copies of the draft statement are circulated to federal agencies, 
to all units of state and local government and to the public.87 The "lead" 
83. See, e.g., Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Re-
solving Complex Scientific, Economic and Social Issues, 71 MicH. L. REv. 111 ( 1972); 
Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need 
for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1276 
( 1972); Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemak-
ing and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485 
( 1970). 
84. 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-47 (1970). 
85. This statement must contain 
a detailed statement by the responsible official on- ( i) the environmental 
impact of the proposed action, ( ii) any adverse environmental effects which 
cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to 
the proposed action, ( iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of 
man's _environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term pro-
ductivity, and ( v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources 
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1970). 
86. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1123 (D.C. 
Cir. 1971). 
87. See section 9 of the Council on Environmental Quality Guidelines for Pr~p­
aration of Environmetal Impact Statements and Appendices II and IV, 38 Fed. 
Reg. 20550 (1973). These regulations implement section 102(2)c of NEPA which 
requires the responsible federal official to consult and obtain comments from other 
federal agencies, state and local agencies and the public. 42 U.S.C. § 4332( b) 
(1970). Comment from state and local agencies and the public is obtained through 
the OMB A-95 clearing house process. See 40 Fed. Reg. 47,960 ( 1975). 
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agency has a legal duty to consider and respond to opposing views.88 
These comments and responses must accompany the statement through the 
entire decisionmaking process, and a copy of the final statement, with 
comments and responses attached, must be recirculated to those who com-
mented.89 If the response is deficient, aggrieved commentators may seek 
judicial review. 
If an agency process requires a formal hearing, this hearing is used 
as a part of the review process of the NEPA statement. However, 
the impact statement process itself does not require a formal "on the 
record" hearing and even a "public hearing" is discretionary.90 Where 
the adjudicatory hearing has proven to be counterproductive, Con-
gress could simply repeal that portion of the enabling statute requiring a 
hearing "on the record." 91 
In terms of the six criteria of acceptable agency process, the comprehen-
sive impact evaluation process appears superior to the adjudicatory format. 
First, it would in fact assure more impartiality than is generally presumed 
to exist in current agency practice. Perhaps the most criticized aspect of 
agency regulatory activity is the allegation that agencies become "captives" 
of the industries they regulate and tend to become tunnel-visioned zealots 
executing their perceived mission heedless of its repercussions on other pro-
grams.92 ·Under the circulation procedures prescribed, the decisionmaking 
agency would no longer function in the private half-light that has charac-
terized so much of agency "adjudication." Instead, the agency would be 
required to submit its decisions for comment to sister federal agencies with 
interrelated missions, to state and local counterparts, and to the public. 
The review process would assure impartiality by imposing on the lead 
agency a duty to respond to these parties~ comments in a way that meets 
the standards imposed by the courts, for responses must be supported 
by "substantial evidence" "substantial evidence on the whole record" or 
the "rule of reason." oa 
To fulfill the competency requirement, agencies must marshall and bring 
to focus upon a given issue the necessary range of interdisciplinary data 
88. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 10( a), 42 U.S.C. § 4332( c) 
(1970). 
89. Id. § 10(b), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1970). 
90. Id. § 7(d), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1970). Agency decisions not involving a 
fonnal hearing are many times more numerous than those having a hearing require-
ment. 
91. In agency licensing proceedings in which rival applicants are processing 
"mutually exclusive" applications it would be necessary, absent statutory change, to 
hold an adjudicatory hearing for the limited purpose of selecting applicants. See 
Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 u.s: 327 (1945). 
92. Benjamin, supra note 8, at 219-20; Berger, supra note 9, 204-06; Hector, supra 
note 8, 956-57. 
93. For a discussion of the various court-imposed standards, see L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL 
CoNTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 600-04 ( 1965); Davis, supra note 79, at 525-31, 
535-38. 
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and expertise required to produce. a sound decision.94 The impact state-
ment process would depend on a substantive "record" composed of the 
lead agency's staff analysis and justification, the comments, and the lead 
agency "response." Compliance with the steps of the impact statement 
process would guarantee that all aspects of the problem received reasoned 
consideration . 
. The impact statement process would be superior to adjudication in terms 
of time and cost limitations. The experience with environmental impact 
statements suggests that in the majority of instances the process can be 
completed within an acceptable time frame specified by law or regulation. 
The costs of the comment process appear to be much lower than the costs 
of the hearing process with its attendant keeping of a record, calling of 
witnesses, and preparation of exhibits. 
A decisionmaking process must provide adequate notice for submission 
of representative viewpoints .. &isting agency process is sometimes subject 
to the criticism that notice published in the Federal Register may either 
be so general or elliptic or deal with such technical terminology that parties, 
especially laymen, may not realize the effect a proposed agency action 
will have. The draft impact statement would be physically circulated to 
all requesting parties pursuant to the procedures and public notice rules 
heretofore described. The complete disclosure of the proposed decision, 
its impacts, ramifications and alternatives not only would provide complete 
notice, but also would be a significant vehicle for public information and 
education. 
Another critical element in any decisionmaking process is the lead 
agency's responsiveness to relevant comments. The process must clearly 
demonstrate that comments are given meaningful consideration and are to 
a reasonable extent factored into the final agency decision. More than five 
years' experience with environmental impact statements suggests that the 
lead agency will effectively respond to the comments. Congress has indi-
cated approval of statutory "consultation" procedures by incorporating 
them into other agency decisionmaking processes. 95 
94. Mr. Hector's description of the CAB use of anonymous opinion writers to 
rationalize board decisions suggests that many agency decisions are not based on 
detailed scrutiny of the voluminous records. Hector, supra note 8, at 947. 
95. One example is the structure Congress devised for factoring federal agency 
comment into state coastal zone management plans during the preapproval stage. 
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1454-56 ( 1972). After these 
comments have been incorporated into the state plan and the plan has been ap-
proved by the Secretary of Commerce, all comm~nting federal agencies must conduct 
their business in a manner "consistent" with the approved state plan. I d. § 1456 (c) 
( 1 ) , ( 2). This mechanism clearly presupposes that federal comment will be taken 
into account. For another example of interagency collaboration through a comment-and-
response process, see the Noise Control Act of 1972 which provides, by amendment to 
section 611 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, for a "collaborative" agency approach 
between EPA and FAA for formulation of regulations for the control and abatement 
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The control and accountability necessary for a sound and reasonable 
decisionmaking process . can be obtained through judicial review. The 
comprehensive impact statement process, through comment and response, 
will narrow the disputed issues to a manageable compass so that a 
reviewing court can evaluate them to determine whether the decision of the 
lead agency is supported by a substantial basis. The . agency decision 
would contain a statement of findings of fact and conclusions of law suf-
ficiently detailed for the court to determine whether it is the product of 
a "reasoned process." 
A salutary feature of the comment process is that it preserves the op-
portunity for interest-oriented submissions and provides the commenter 
with his opportunity to be heard. However, since evidentiary submissions 
are not made primarily by the parties, as they are in existing agency adjudi-
cation, the comment process offers a greater range of points of view from 
which objectivity can be derived. The comprehensive impact statement pro-
cess offers promise of a means to shorten and to improve the decision-
making process in the face of formidable pressures for resolution of issues 
involving energy, the environment, and complex socio-economic matters. 
V. CoNCLUSION 
Administrative agencies were created to deal with problems which the 
traditional government bodies were unable to handle effectively. However, 
as the two situations described above indicate, the rapid growth of tech-
nology has made the once forward-looking agency procedure a hindrance 
to efficient and effective decisionmaking. Fundamental changes, such as those 
embodied in the comprehensive impact statement, are needed to enable 
agencies to manage complex scientific and technical data in a more effi-
cient manner and to produce decisions that will pass muster with reviewing 
courts. 
of aircraft noise and sonic boom. A similar device is prescribed in the Clean Air Act 
of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 ( 1970 ), whereby the National Academy of Sciences is 
designated as an arbiter as to whether technology is available to comply with air 
quality goals. 
